Cyber-intruder
sparks massive federal response — and debate over dealing with threats
By Ellen Nakashima,
Dec 09, 2011 12:06 AM EST
The Washington PostPublished: December 9, 2011
The first sign of trouble was a mysterious signal
emanating from deep within the U.S. military’s classified computer network. Like
a human spy, a piece of covert software in the supposedly secure system was
“beaconing” — trying to send coded messages back to its creator.
An elite team working in a windowless room at the
National Security Agency soon determined that a rogue program had infected a
classified network, kept separate from the public Internet, that harbored some
of the military’s most important secrets, including battle plans used by
commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Secretary of Homeland Security says cyber security
is rapidly growing issue.
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Key players in Operation Buckshot Yankee
Cyber intruder sparks response, debate
Proactive steps against cyberattacks
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cyber attacks
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The government’s top cyberwarriors couldn’t
immediately tell who created the program or why, although they would come to
suspect the Russian intelligence service. Nor could they tell how long it had
been there, but they soon deduced the ingeniously simple means of transmission,
according to several current and former U.S. officials. The malicious software,
or malware, caught a ride on an everyday thumb drive that allowed it to enter
the secret system and begin looking for documents to steal. Then it spread by
copying itself onto other thumb drives.
Pentagon officials consider the incident, discovered
in October 2008, to be the most serious breach of the U.S. military’s classified
computer systems. The response, over the past three years, transformed the
government’s approach to cybersecurity, galvanizing the creation of a new
military command charged with bolstering the military’s computer defenses and
preparing for eventual offensive operations. The efforts to neutralize the
malware, through an operation code-named Buckshot Yankee, also demonstrated the
importance of computer espionage in devising effective responses to
cyberthreats.
But the breach and its aftermath also have opened a
rare window into the legal concerns and bureaucratic tensions that affect
military operations in an arena where the United States faces increasingly
sophisticated threats. Like the running debates over the use of drones and other
evolving military technologies, rapid advances in computing capability are
forcing complex deliberations over the appropriate use of new tools and weapons.
This article, which contains previously undisclosed
information on the extent of the infection, the nature of the response and the
fractious policy debate it inspired, is based on interviews with two dozen
current and former U.S. officials and others with knowledge of the operation.
Many of them assert that while the military has a growing technical capacity to
operate in cyberspace, it lacks authority to defend civilian networks
effectively.
“The danger is not so much that cyber capabilities
will be used without warning by some crazy general,” said Stewart A. Baker, a
former NSA general counsel. “The real worry is they won’t be used at all because
the generals don’t know what the rules are.”
A furious investigation
The malware that provoked Buckshot Yankee had
circulated on the Internet for months without causing alarm, as just one threat
among many. Then it showed up on the military computers of a NATO government in
June 2008, according to Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer of a Finnish firm
that analyzed the intruder.
2.
He dubbed it “Agent.btz,” the next name in a sequence
used at his company, F-Secure. “Agent.bty” was taken.
Four months later, in October 2008, NSA analysts
discovered the malware on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, which the
Defense and State departments use to transmit classified material but not the
nation’s most sensitive information. Agent.btz also infected the Joint Worldwide
Intelligence Communication System, which carries top-secret information to U.S.
officials throughout the world.
Personal Post
Such networks are typically “air-gapped” — physically
separated from the free-for-all of the Internet, with its countless varieties of
malicious code, such as viruses and worms, created to steal information or
damage systems. Officials had long been concerned with the unauthorized removal
of classified material from secure networks; now malware had gotten in and was
attempting to communicate to the broader Internet.
One likely scenario is that an American soldier,
official or contractor in Afghanistan — where the largest number of infections
occurred — went to an Internet cafe, used a thumb drive in an infected computer
and then inserted the drive in a classified machine. “We knew fairly confidently
that the mechanism had been somebody going to a kiosk and doing something they
shouldn’t have as opposed to somebody who had been able to get inside the
network,” one former official said.
Once a computer became infected, any thumb drive used
on the machine acquired a copy of Agent.btz, ready for propagation to other
computers, like bees carrying pollen from flower to flower. But to steal
content, the malware had to communicate with a master computer for instructions
on what files to remove and how to transmit them.
These signals, or beacons, were first spotted by a
young analyst in the NSA’s Advanced Networks Operations (ANO) team, a group of
mostly 20- and 30-something computing experts assembled in 2006 to hunt for
suspicious activity on the government’s secure networks. Their office was a
nondescript windowless room in Ops1, a boxy, low-rise building on the 660-acre
campus of the NSA.
ANO’s operators are among 30,000 civilian and military
personnel at NSA, whose main mission is to collect foreign communications
intelligence on enemies abroad. The agency is forbidden to gather intelligence
on Americans or on U.S. soil without special authorization from a court whose
proceedings are largely secret.
NSA, whose employees hold 800 PhDs in mathematics,
science and engineering, is based at Fort Meade, an Army base between Baltimore
and Washington that has the world’s largest collection of supercomputers as well
as its own police force and silicon-chip plant.
The ANO operators determined that the breach was
serious after a few days of furious investigation. On the afternoon of Friday,
Oct. 24,Richard C. Schaeffer Jr., then the NSA’s top computer systems protection
officer, was in an agency briefing with President George W. Bush, who was making
his last visit to the NSA before leaving office. An aide handed Schaeffer a note
alerting him to the breach.
3.
Cyber-intruder sparks massive federal response — and
debate over dealing with threats
The Secretary of Homeland Security says cyber security
is rapidly growing issue.
More on this Story
Key players in Operation Buckshot Yankee
Cyber intruder sparks response, debate
Proactive steps against cyberattacks
More headlines from around the world
View all Items in this Story
More firms, governments that have been victims of
cyber attacks
See photos
Permanent slumber
That evening, NSA officials briefed top levels of the
U.S. government: the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the deputy defense
secretary and senior congressional leaders, telling them about the incident.
Working through the night, the ANO operators pursued a
potential fix. Since Agent.btz was beaconing out in search of instructions,
perhaps they could devise a way to order the malware to shut itself down. The
next morning, in a room strewn with empty pizza boxes and soda cans, they
sketched out their plan on a white board. But before it could be put into
action, the NSA team had to make sure it would not affect the performance of
other software, including the programs that battlefield commanders use for
intelligence and communications. They needed to run a test.
“Our objective,” recalled Schaeffer, “was first, do no
harm.”
That afternoon, the team members loaded a computer
server into a truck and drove it to a nearby office of the Defense Information
Systems Agency, which operates the department’s long-haul telecommunications and
satellite networks.
At 2:30 p.m. they activated a program designed to
recognize the beaconing of Agent.btz and respond. Soon after, the malware on the
test server fell into permanent slumber.
Devising the technical remedy was only the first step.
Defeating the threat required neutralizing Agent.btz everywhere it had spread on
government networks, a grueling process that involved isolating individual
computers, taking them offline, cleaning them, and reformatting hard drives.
A key player in Buckshot Yankee was NSA’s Tailored
Access Operations (TAO), a secretive unit dating to the early 1990s that
specialized in intelligence operations overseas focused on gathering sensitive
technical information. These specialists ventured outside the military’s
networks to look for Agent.btz in a process called “exploitation” or electronic
spying.
The TAO identified new variants of the malware and
helped network defenders prepare to neutralize them before they infected
military computers.
“It’s the ability to look outside our wire,” said one
military official.
Officials debated whether to use offensive tools to
neutralize the malware on non-military networks, including those in other
countries. The military’s offensive cyber unit, Joint Functional Component
Command — Network Warfare, proposed some options for doing so.
Senior officials rejected them on the grounds that
Agent.btz appeared to be an act of espionage, not an outright attack, and didn’t
justify such an aggressive response, according to those familiar with the
conversations.
As the NSA worked to neutralize Agent.btz on its
government computers, Strategic Command, which oversees deterrence strategy for
nuclear weapons, space and cyberspace, raised the military’s information
security threat level. A few weeks later, in November, an order went out banning
the use of thumb drives across the Defense Department worldwide. It was the most
controversial order of the operation.
4.
Cyber-intruder sparks massive federal response — and
debate over dealing with threats
Agent.btz had spread widely among military computers
around the world, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, creating the potential for
major losses of intelligence. Yet the ban generated backlash among officers in
the field, many of whom relied on the drives to download combat imagery or share
after-action reports.
The NSA and the military investigated for months how
the infection occurred. They retrieved thousands of thumb drives, many of which
were infected. Much energy was spent trying to find “Patient Zero,” officials
said. “It turned out to be too complicated,” said one. “We could never bring it
down to as clear as . . . ‘that’s the thumb drive.’ ”
The rate of new infections finally subsided in early
2009. Officials say no evidence emerged that Agent.btz succeeded in
communicating with a master computer or in putting secret documents in enemy
hands. The ban on thumb drives has been partially lifted because other security
measures have been put in place.
‘A great catalyst’
Buckshot Yankee bolstered the argument for creating
Cyber Command, a new unit designed to protect the military’s computer and
communications systems. It gave NSA Director Alexander the platform to press the
case, advocated by others, that the new command should be able to use the NSA’s
capabilities to obtain foreign intelligence to defend the military’s systems.
“It was a great catalyst,” said Alexander, although
the effort later faced questions about whether the head of the largest and most
secretive intelligence agency should also lead the new organization.
The new organization, which has a staff of 750 and a
budget of $155 million, brings together the Joint Task Force-Global Network
Operations, which carried out the bulk of the cleanup work under Buckshot
Yankee, and the Network Warfare unit, the military’s offensive cyber arm. It
began full operations on Oct. 31, 2010, with Alexander as its head.
But the creation of Cyber Command did not resolve
several key debates over the national response to cyberthreats. Agent.btz
provoked renewed discussion among senior officials at the White House and key
departments about how to best protect critical private-sector networks.
Some officials argued that the military was better
equipped than the Department of Homeland Security to respond to a major
destructive attack on a power grid or other critical system, but others
disagreed.
“Cyber Command and [Strategic Command] were asking for
way too much authority” by seeking permission to take “unilateral action . . .
inside the United States,” said Gen. James E. Cartwright Jr., who retired as
vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs in August.
Officials also debated how aggressive military
commanders can be in defending their computer systems.
“You have the right of self-defense, but you don’t
know how far you can carry it and under what circumstances, and in what places,”
Cartwright said. “So for a commander who’s out there in a very ambiguous world
looking for guidance, if somebody attacks them, are they supposed to run? Can
they respond?”
5.
Cyber-intruder sparks massive federal response — and
debate over dealing with threats
Questions over the role of offense in cybersecurity
deterrence began in the 1990s, if not earlier, said Martin Libicki, a Rand Corp.
cyberwarfare expert. One reason it is so difficult to craft rules, he said, is
the tendency to cast cyberwar as “good, old-fashioned war in yet another
domain.” Unlike conventional and nuclear warfare, cyberattacks generally are
enabled only by flaws in the target system, he said.
Another reason it is so difficult, said James A.
Lewis, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is
the overlap between cybersecurity operations and the classified world of
intelligence.
“The link to espionage is where the nuclear precedent
breaks down and makes cyber closer to covert operations,” Lewis said.
By the summer of 2009, Pentagon officials had begun
work on a set of rules of engagement, part of a broader cyberdefense effort
called Operation Gladiator Phoenix. They drafted an “execute order” under which
the Strategic and Cyber commands could direct the operations and defense of
military networks anywhere in the world. Initially, the directive applied to
critical privately owned computer systems in the United States.
Several conditions had to be met, according to a
military official familiar with the draft order. The provocation had to be
hostile and directed at the United States, its critical infrastructure or
citizens. It had to present the imminent likelihood of death, serious injury or
damage that threatened national or economic security. The response had to be
coordinated with affected government agencies and combatant commanders. And it
had to be limited to actions necessary to stop the attack, while minimizing
impacts on non-military computers.
“Say someone launched an attack on the U.S. from a
known Chinese army computer — a known hostile computer,” the official said. “You
could maybe disable the computer, but you’re not talking about making it explode
and killing somebody.”
Turf battles
But the effort to create such comprehensive rules of
engagement foundered, said current and former officials with direct knowledge of
the policy debate.
The Justice Department feared setting a legal
precedent for military action in domestic networks. The CIA resisted letting the
military infringe on its foreign turf. The State Department worried the military
would accidentally disrupt a server in a friendly country without seeking
consent, undermining future cooperation. The Department of Homeland Security,
meanwhile, worked to keep its lead role in securing the nation against
cyberthreats.
The debate bogged down over how far the military could
go to parry attacks, which can be routed from server to server, sometimes in
multiple countries. “Could you go only to the first [server] you trace back to?
Could you go all the way to the first point at which the attack emanated from?
Those were the questions that were still being negotiated,” said a former U.S.
official.
The questions were even more vexing when it came to
potentially combating an attack launched from servers within the United States.
The military has no authority to act in cyberspace when the networks are
domestic — unless the operation is on its own systems.
In October 2010, Pentagon officials signed an
agreement with the Department of Homeland Security pledging to work to enhance
the nation’s cybersecurity. But in speeches, Alexander, the head of Cyber
Command, has suggested that more needs to be done.
“Right now, my mission as commander of U.S. Cyber
Command is to defend the military networks,” he said in an April speech in Rhode
Island. “I do not have the authority to look at what’s going on in other
government sectors, nor what would happen in critical infrastructure. That right
now falls to DHS. It also means that I can’t stop it, or at network speed . . .
see what’s happening to it. What we do believe, though, is that that needs to be
accounted for. We have to have a way to protect our critical infrastructure.”
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, in a
speech in California that same month, made her preference clear. “At DHS, we
believe cyberspace is fundamentally a civilian space.”
The execute order was signed in February. The standing
rules of engagement limit the military to the defense of its own networks and do
not allow it to go outside them without special permission from the president.
The next vulnerability?
Almost from the beginning, U.S. officials suspected
that Russia’s spy service created Agent.btz to steal military secrets. In late
2008, Russia issued a denunciation of the allegation, calling it “groundless”
and “irresponsible.”
Former officials say there is evidence of a Russian
role in developing the malware, but some doubt whether the spy service created
Agent.btz to infiltrate U.S. military computers.
Some say it could have been a product of Russia’s
sophisticated mafia, with its extensive computer expertise, to collect all sorts
of protected records worth stealing — or selling to the highest bidder. Or there
could have been Russian involvement in one phase of the malware’s development
before it was adapted by others. Others say they have no doubt that it was
intentionally aimed at the Defense Department. New versions of Agent.btz
continue to appear, years after it was discovered.
What is clear is that Agent.btz revealed weaknesses in
crucial U.S. government computer networks — vulnerabilities based on the weakest
link in the security chain: human beings. The development of new defenses did
not prevent the transfer of massive amounts of information from one classified
network to the anti-
secrecy group WikiLeaks, an act that the government
charges was carried out by an Army intelligence analyst.
NSA analysts know how to neutralize Agent.btz and its
variants, but no one knows when the next vulnerability will be discovered or
what kind of intrusion might ensue.
Richard “Dickie” George, who was the NSA information
assurance technical director until his retirement this year, said that in the
early days of Operation Buckshot Yankee, a four-star general asked when the
danger from Agent.btz would pass and heightened security measures could end.
“We had to break the news to him,” George recalled,
“that this is never going to be over.”
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this
report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/cyber-intruder-sparks-response-debate/2011/12/06/gIQAxLuFgO_story_1htmll